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V 
JURISDICTION 
Section 3 of Article 8 of the Utah Constitution, Section 78-
2-2(3) of the Utah Code Ann. and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear 
this appeal. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment (hereinafter "Judgment") 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, 
dismissing the Plaintiffs1 Complaint, no cause of action, and 
granting judgment against Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton and 
Kenneth R. Norton dba Interstate Rentals, Inc. on a Trust Deed 
Note, ordering the property as security under the Trust Deed Note 
(hereinafter "the Property") be judicially foreclosed and entering 
judgment for damages suffered due to a wrongful injunction against 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter "Tracy Collins") 
as surety on a bond. 
PERTINENT RULE 
The pertinent provision of Rule 65A(c) , Utah R. Civ. P. is 
as follows: 
(c) Security. Except as otherwise provided by law, no 
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue 
except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in 
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of 
such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by 
any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restrained.... 
(emphasis added). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); e.g. , 
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1988) ; Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). A finding is 
clearly erroneous only if it is without adequate evidentiary 
support. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Western 
Capital v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This Courtfs analysis should begin with the trial court's 
findings of fact and not with Appellant's view of the facts. 
Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2 147 (Utah 1987). It is Tracy Collins1 
heavy burden to first marshall all evidence that supports the 
lower court's findings, "and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence'...." In re 
Estate of Bartell, 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1989) (quoting Walker, 
743 P.2d at 193). 
In fixing damages, the trial court is vested with broad dis-
cretion, and its award will not be set aside unless it is mani-
festly unjust or indicates that the trial court neglected per-
tinent elements. Maybey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co., 682 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1984); Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Similarly, an award of attorney's fees is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in 
2 
absence of a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2 985 (Utah 1988); Turtle Mat, v. 
Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2 677 (Utah 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arose when Plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively 
"White Pine Ranches") enjoined the Sharps1 scheduled Trustee's 
Sale the day before it was to occur by filing a complaint alleging 
certain breaches of contract. Enjoined from proceeding with the 
Sale, the Sharps counterclaimed, inter alia, for a judgment 
dissolving the injunction and for a determination that the re-
straining order was wrongfully issued, that White Pine Ranches 
breached the contract, and for an order of judicial foreclosure of 
the Property. The Temporary Restraining Order initially issued on 
September 4, 1986 required a bond in the amount of $2,400.00. 
Because the cash bond was inadequate for the continuing injunc-
tion, Judge J. Dennis Frederick ordered additional security in the 
amount of $50,000.00, which Tracy Collins posted on January 11, 
1988. 
The court below held the Sharps had been wrongfully enjoined 
from holding their Trustee's Sale and as a result incurred over 
$100,000 in interest to the time of trial, attorney's fees in 
defending the wrongful injunction, and trustee's fees. Conserva-
tively, to prevent any double recovery, the trial court determined 
the fair market value of the Property and awarded damages on the 
3 
bond only for the amount ($28,570.63) which the Sharps were 
undersecured. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Citations to the record will be abbreviated as follows: 
Record on Appeal: "R." 
Trial Transcript: "Tr." 
Exhibit: "Ex." 
Finding of Fact: "F." 
Conclusion of Law: "C." 
Supplemental Finding of Fact: "Supp. F." 
Supplemental Conclusion of Law: "Supp. C." 
A copy of the Order Re: Motion to Set Liability on Bond, 
containing the Supplemental Findings ("Supp. F.") and Supplemental 
Conclusions of Law ("Supp. C") is attached in an Addendum. The 
Addendum shall be cited after the citation to the record or Ex. as 
"Add." with the page number. Tracy Collins attached only a draft 
of the Findings and Conclusions to its Brief, in which Conclusion 
No. 3 3 is incorrectly set forth, as well as other Findings and 
Conclusions not relevant here. A correct copy of the Findings and 
Conclusions will be attached as an Addendum to the Respondents1 
Brief to Saunders, et al. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are necessary for a proper determination 
of this appeal in addition to and/or to rectify the facts set 
forth in the Brief of Surety/Appellant: 
1. The trial judge held that: 
The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by 
Plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 
1986 in the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the 
security posted by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of 
$28,570•63 for their interest, attorney's fees and 
other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of 
the wrongful Temporary Restraining Order, and for which 
amount the Sharps are not secured by the fair market 
value of the Subject Property, 
C. No. 3 3 (R. at 1363) (emphasis added). 
2. The trial court found that interest on the principal due 
under the Trust Deed Note for the period July 1, 1986 to July 30, 
1987 equalled $66,913.08, and interest for the period July 1, 1987 
to March 22, 1988 amounted to $48,764.04. Supp. F. No. 8 (R. at 
1395); Add. at 3. Then the lower court held "[t]he amount of 
interest alone which [h]as accumulated (over $100,000) since 
September, 1986, when the injunction was first issued far exceeds 
the amount of both plaintiffs' cash bond and the security posted 
by Tracy Collins Bank." Supp. C. No. 4 (R. at 1396-97); Add. at 
4-5. 
3. Attorney' s fees were incurred by the Sharps in the 
amount of $5,763.55, resulting from the wrongful injunction 
"related to the defense of White Pine's injunction," not just to 
the defense of the Temporary Restraining Order as claimed by Tracy 
Collins, and excluded legal services from and after January, 1988, 
through the trial, post-trial motions and the appeal. Supp. F. 
No. 10 (R. at 1396); Add. at 4. 
4. The matter of attorney's fees was reserved by stipula-
tion until after trial. Tr. 413 (R. at 1644). When presented, 
Tracy Collins did not object to the affidavits of Sharps' counsel 
setting forth the fees resulting from the wrongful injunction. R. 
at 1251-1620 and 1640. 
5 
5. Tracy Collins loaned White Pines $650,000 for construc-
tion of the improvements on the Property. Ex. 77. Approximately 
two-thirds of this loan remained owing at trial. Ex. 64, intro-
duced but not received; Plaintiff Felton's Testimony, Tr. 118 (R. 
at 1642). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Brief, Tracy Collins claims the district court erred 
in granting its Order re: Motion to Set Liability on Bond (herein-
after "Order"), which Order found liability on the bond for the 
difference between the Judgment in the underlying action and the 
fair market value of the Property subject to the Judgment. (A 
complete copy of the Order is attached as Add. at 1-5) . This 
misstates the trial court's Order. Instead, the lower court found 
that the "costs and damages" resulting from the wrongful injunc-
tion, including attorney's fees and interest, greatly exceeded the 
amount of the bond issued by Tracy Collins. However, to avoid any 
possibility of a double recovery, the court reduced the award of 
damages to the extent that the Judgment was secured by the fair 
market value of the Property at the time of dissolution of the 
injunction. 
These "costs and damages" were "incurred and suffered" by the 
Sharps as a direct result of the wrongful injunction. But for 
White Pine Ranches enjoining the Sharps' foreclosure sale, the 
Sharps would have foreclosed and received either the Property or 
its value two years earlier. Alternatively stated, if the 
6 
Trustee's Sale had not been enjoined, no interest would have 
accrued (at least to the extent of the current value of the 
Property). Further, as a direct result of the injunction, the 
Sharps were forced to hire attorneys to resist and to seek dis-
solution of the injunction.1 
Tracy Collins cannot raise the defense of ultra vires for 
the first time on appeal. Moreover, this defense would have 
failed on the merits since Tracy Collins exercised its valid 
banking power to protect its $650,000 construction loan made to 
White Pine Ranches. In addition, Tracy Collins is equitably 
estopped from denying liability since the injunction was continued 
as a result of the bond. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SHARPS ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST, 
HAVING BEEN WRONGFULLY ENJOINED FROM 
FORECLOSING FOR TWO YEARS 
The Sharps have been severely damaged as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction due to the fact they were unable to 
foreclose on the Property for two years and therefore incurred 
Under Utah law, Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-32, the 
Sharps must have credited the fair market value of the 
Property at the time of the Trustee's Sale against the 
debt owed by White Pine Ranches. Thus, as a direct 
result of the wrongful injunction, the Sharps, enjoined 
from the foreclosure sale, lost the use of interest on 
the value of the Property until the injunction was 
dissolved. 
7 
over $100,000 in interest. Pursuant to Rule 65A(c), Utah R. Civ. 
P. , the Sharps are entitled to recover from the security provided 
by Tracy Collins "for payment of such costs and damages as may be 
incurred or suffered by them as a result of being wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) (emphasis added); 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1984). 
On September 4, 1986, the day before the Trustee's Sale of 
the Property, White Pine Ranches filed their action and obtained a 
Temporary Restraining Order. R. at 2-51. Because of the injunc-
tion, the Sharps were prevented from conducting a foreclosure sale 
until the court below rendered its Judgment on September 26, 1988 
dissolving the injunction. Judgment (R. at 1370-1377) ; Tracy Add. 
C.2 Substantially more than $100,000 in interest accrued during 
that period on the principal due under the Trust Deed and Note 
signed by White Pine Ranches. Supp. F. No. 8 (R. at 1395) ; Add. 
at 3. 
As noted in a case cited by Tracy Collins in its Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Re-
versal submitted to this Court, Estate of Sweets v. Behrens, 118 
In fact, no sale has yet occurred since White Pine 
Ranches has posted additional security to stay execution 
on appeal. 
8 
Misc.2d 1062, 462 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1983),3 interest is a 
proper element of damages covered by an injunction bond and begins 
accruing on the date the injunction is initially granted. See 
also Matter of Simon, 36 N.C. App. 122, 243 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1978) 
("Interest accruing on the debt [is] ... a proper measure of 
damages11 resulting from a delay in a foreclosure proceeding) ; 
Allen v. Pitchess, 36 Cal. App.3d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1974). 
Interest should not be excluded, as Tracy Collins argues, as 
an item of injunction damages merely because it was awarded under 
the Trust Deed Note in the Judgment against White Pine Ranches. 
The amount of interest which accrued under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note during the injunction far exceeded the $50,000 bond 
posted by Tracy Collins. Supp. F. No. 8 (R. at 1395); Add. at 3. 
However, to avoid the problem of double recovery which concerned 
the court in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev. , 83 
Nev. 196, 427 P.2d 1 (1967), the trial court below took into 
consideration the fair market value of the Property at dissolution 
of the injunction and awarded damages only in the amount by which 
the underlying judgment was undersecured. Judgment (R. at 1373); 
Tracy Add. C. 
In Glens Falls Ins. Co., the implicit assumption made by the 
Nevada Supreme Court was that the property at issue adequately 
3
 Tracy Collins did not cite this case again in its Brief 
of Surety/Appellant. 
9 
secured the amount of the debt, including interest. If the 
subject Property does not adequately secure the Judgment and the 
damages for the wrongful injunction, the Sharps must be able to 
recover the difference against the bond (i.e., the Judgment amount 
less the fair market value of the Property).4 See Financial 
Acceptance Corp. v. Garvey, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 399 N.E.2d 506, 
508 (1979) (To the extent "the proceeds of any foreclosure sale 
were insufficient," "interest accruing on the first mortgage 
obligation" is includable as damages under the injunction bond). 
Tracy Collins agreed in its Brief that the trial court should 
have determined the fair market value of the Property upon dis-
solution of the injunction. See page 11 of the Brief of Sure-
ty/Appellant. However, Tracy Collins then erroneously argued the 
proper measure of damages is the reduction in fair market value of 
the Property during the period of restraint. Jd. Such a view is 
entirely too simplistic. 
The amount by which the Sharps are undersecured is 
actually larger than $28,570.63. To simplify the 
accounting, the Order did not include all interest on 
principal to date of Judgment or on attorney's fees or 
court costs. In the event of an actual sale of the 
Property, the Sharps will incur the expenses of real 
estate commissions and closing costs. Further, it will 
take some period of time to find a buyer and the Sharps 
will lose the present value of the sales price for the 
period they have to hold the Property before it sells. 
These real world costs are precisely the kind which 
cause a judgment creditor, such as the Sharps, to bid 
less than fair market value at any Sheriff's Sale of 
the Property. 
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Assuming arguendo that the value of the Property did not 
decrease during the period of restraint,5 Tracy's argument ignores 
the concept of present value. Unless the Property substantially 
increased in value instead of remaining constant, the Sharps would 
lose interest on the amount which could have been realized from a 
sale on or about the date of the Temporary Restraining Order 
(September 4, 1986), which date was some two years before the 
entry of the court's Order. The purpose of an award of interest 
in such circumstances is to put the damaged party in the position 
he would have been in but for the wrong suffered. See Alexander 
v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (1982); Walter v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp. , 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). Stated 
alternatively, the present value of $20,000 per acre in 1988 is 
much less than the same value per acre in 1986. 
In Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N.C. 335, 154 S.E. 318 (1930) and 
Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 8 
Cal. App. 3d 752, 87 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cases 
cited by White Pine Ranches in its Docketing Statement but not 
At the hearing in January, 1988 on the Sharps' Petition 
for Additional Security, the trial court found the 
Property was worth approximately $17,500 to $2 0,000 per 
acre. Tr. at 493-94 (R. at 1644) . Previously, LeRoy 
Pia, White Pine Ranches' appraiser whose valuations were 
exclusively used throughout the proceedings, valued the 
Property on June 30, 1985 at $29,062.50 per acre. Ex. 
96. Accordingly, the value of the Property had been 
declining from the date of the Temporary Restraining 
Order (September 4, 1986). (The fair market value at 
the time of trial was found to be $2 0,000 per acre. 
Supp. F. No. 2 (R. at 1394); Add. at 2). 
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cited in any Appellants1 Brief, the courts held interest was a 
foreseeable item of damage for wrongful injunction. In Gruber, 
the court stated: 
The creditor is entitled to the same security at the 
date of the dissolution of the injunction that he had at 
the date of its issuance — no more, no less. If by 
reason of the issuance of the injunction he has lost the 
interest which has thereafter accrued, this loss may 
justly be included in the damages, recoverable in the 
bond. 
154 S.E. at 321. In Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, the Court declared: 
The delay in the sale caused a loss of the use of the 
money that would have been paid if the sale had not been 
delayed. Interest on the money during the delay is a 
measure of damages for the loss of its use. 
87 Cal. Rptr. at 576. 
In two analogous contexts, supersedeas and performance 
bonds, interest is awarded as an item of damages under bonds. See 
U-M Inv. v. Ray, 701 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1985) and New Amsterdam 
Casualty Co. v. Mitchell, 325 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1963). As with 
supersedeas and performance bonds, the accrual of interest was a 
foreseeable damage by Tracy Collins at the time of posting its 
bond. By wrongfully enjoining the Sharps from collecting on the 
debt, White Pine Ranches caused interest to accrue on the debt 
and deprived the Sharps of the use of the Property or its value in 
dollars. 
Tracy Collins erroneously interprets the trial court's 
Judgment as specifying damages for the wrongful injunction to be 
the difference between the Judgment in the underlying action and 
the fair market value of the Property. The trial court did not so 
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determine the damages. Rather, the court below ruled that the 
damages, including interest, attorney's fees and other damages, 
greatly exceeded the amount of the injunction bond in their 
action. Supp. C. No. 4 (R. at 1396-97); Add. at 4-5. Because the 
Sharps were entitled to recover their interest in the underlying 
Judgment, the Court then reduced the damages found on the bond 
amount (to prevent any double recovery) by the amount the Sharps 
Judgment was undersecured by the fair market value of the Proper-
ty at the time of dissolution. 
POINT II 
SHARPS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER 
DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THE WRONGFUL INJUNCTION 
Under Rule 65A(c) , Utah R. Civ. P. , the Supreme Court has 
determined that injunction damages "include the attorney fees of 
the party wrongfully enjoined." Mountain States, 681 P.2d at 
1262. Several cases which Tracy Collins cites in its Brief also 
support the award of attorney's fees by the trial court as dam-
ages. See e.g. , Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (Attorney's fees awarded to those who were successful in 
having temporary restraining order enjoining trustee's sale 
dissolved). Even the Glens Falls case, cited by Tracy Collins, 
supports the award of attorney's fees: 
It is unnecessary to compartmentalize the steps and 
events surrounding the issuance of a temporary restrain-
ing order and effort to obtain a preliminary injunction 
as suggested by counsel for appellant. The legal steps 
taken by counsel for respondent after being served with 
the restraining order can no doubt be said to aid its 
prospective defense of the cause of action as well as an 
effort to preclude issuance of the preliminary injunc-
tion, but the main thrust of the effort was to defeat 
13 
the restraining order.... The amount of the attorneys1 
fees was discretionary with the trial court. We find no 
abuse of discretion. 
427 P.2d at 3. 
Tracy Collins argues attorney's fees incurred in opposing the 
issuance of the application of the Temporary Restraining Order are 
not recoverable damages, while such fees are recoverable in 
"proceedings directed at removing an injunction." Brief of 
Surety/Appellant at 16. To argue that the Sharps can recover 
their fees in dissolving the injunction but not in defending 
against the initial issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order is 
clearly to suggest a distinction which lacks any logical appeal. 
This argument also ignores the trial court's finding that 
$5,763.55 in attorney's fees "related to the defense of White 
Pine's injunction," which defense continued through trial.6 Supp. 
F. No. 10 (R. at 1396) ; Add at 4 (emphasis added) . Further, the 
6
 The district court Findings were based upon the Second 
Supplement to Affidavit in Support of Request for 
Attorney's Fees in which at least 4% of the total fees 
related to the defense of the injunction. This was 
based on a detailed breakdown of the fees through 
January, 1988. (R. at 1251-60). (The trial was orig-
inally set for just two days, January 28 and 29, 1988). 
Tracy Collins did not object to the affidavit then and 
therefore cannot object now for the first time. Beard 
v. Duqdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
("Appellants ... did not object to the adequacy of the 
affidavit before the lower court. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the evidence . . . was sufficient as a 
matter of law"). However, if a more detailed breakdown 
is required by this Court, the issue of amount of fees 
could be remanded to the district court as suggested by 
Tracy Collins in its Brief at 17. 
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cases Tracy Collins cites for the proposition are clearly dis-
tinguishable. 
In Estate of Sweets, cited by Tracy Collins in its Memorandum 
re: Motion for Summary Reversal but not in its Brief, the court 
distinguished its case from two prior cases allowing attorney's 
fees for opposing the motion for preliminary injunction because no 
bond or undertaking had been required when the temporary restrain-
ing order was granted. In the two earlier cases where the courts 
had ordered a bond with the preliminary injunction, attorney's 
fees were awarded for opposing the temporary restraining order. 
In Eisen v. Post, 15 Misc.2d 59, 179 N.Y.S.2d 691, 693 (Sup. Ct. 
1958), the court noted: 
The clearest item of services attributable to the 
injunction appears to be that rendered in opposing, 
albeit unsuccessfully, before trial, the continuation of 
the injunctive provision of the order to show cause in 
the order for a temporary injunction. 
See also Carroll v. Renin, 25 A.D.2d 743, 269 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App. 
Div. 1966) (Defendants entitled to recover attorney's fees where 
efforts of attorneys resulted in vacation of restraining order and 
denial of the preliminary injunction). 
The cases of Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 
1985) and State ex rel. County of Shannon v. Chilton, 626 S.W.2d 
426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cited by Tracy Collins, can both be 
distinguished. Neither court allowed attorney's fees because the 
injunctions sought were never issued and bonds were not posted. 
Therefore, "the proceeding obviously did not involve the question 
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of whether the injunction should be dissolved." Wolverton, 329 
S.E.2d at 889, 
This Court's holding in Beard v. Dugdale, supports the award 
of attorney's fees incurred in opposing a Temporary Restraining 
Order. In Beard, a temporary restraining order was issued, 
without opposing counsel being present, and a bond was ordered as 
security. After a hearing, the temporary restraining order was 
dissolved. This Court held that attorney's fees incurred after 
the dissolution of the temporary restraining order did not con-
stitute costs or damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully 
issued injunction but related to the suit independent of the 
injunction. However, the trial court implicitly upheld the award 
of attorney's fees incurred prior to the dissolution of the 
temporary restraining order (less $390 worth of time incurred 
after the dissolution). 
The bond posted by Tracy Collins in the instant case should 
serve as security for the attorney's fees incurred in opposing the 
Temporary Restraining Order. These fees are damages which result 
directly and foreseeably from the issuance of a wrongful injunc-
tion and should not be segregated from those fees, which Tracy 
Collins concedes are recoverable, for dissolving the injunction. 
But for the wrongful Temporary Restraining Order, the Sharps would 
not have incurred these attorney's fees. 
Tracy Collins also suggests, without any reference to the 
Record, that the issuance of the injunction was so ancillary to 
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the main action "as to result in a de minimus award of attorneys1 
fees." Brief of Surety/Appellant at 17. In support thereof, 
Tracy referred to Global Contact Lens v. Knight. 254 So.2d 807 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), without noting the exception recog-
nized therein. The court held where "the means employed, without 
further or additional services, accomplished both results simul-
taneously," attorney's fees need not be segregated between the 
main action and those procuring the dissolution of the wrongful 
injunction. 254 So.2d at 810; see also McAtee v. Faulkner Land & 
Livestock, 113 Idaho 393, 744 P.2d 121, 128 (Ct. App. 1987) 
("Where the work performed to obtain dissolution of a restraining 
order or preliminary injunction is the same as that performed to 
defend against a claim on the merits, there is no basis to seg-
regate recoverable fees from nonrecoverable fees . . . forcing the 
wrongfully restrained party somehow to distinguish among services 
that are truly indistinguishable."); Esselystyn v. United States 
Gold Corp. , 69 Colo. 547, 196 P. 183, 185 (1921) (Where "it was 
necessary to try the case fully in order to determine whether the 
injunction was wrongfully issued..., all expenses connected with 
such trial are proper elements of damage."). 
In this action, the trial court additionally found the Sharps 
had suffered "other damages" as a result of the wrongfully issued 
injunction. The trial court found these "other damages" included 
trustee fs fees in the amount of $1,803.80. F. No. 92 (R. at 
1351); Tracy Add. B and Supp. F. No. 9 (R. at 1395); Add. at 3. 
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The Temporary Restraining Order prevented the Trustee's Sale set 
for the following day. Under the authorities set forth above, 
such damages were foreseeable to White Pine Ranches in obtaining 
the injunction, and as such are recoverable by the Sharps. 
POINT III 
TRACY COLLINS CANNOT RAISE A DEFENSE 
OF ULTRA VIRES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL; MOREOVER, TRACY COLLINS' ACTS 
WERE WITHIN BANKING POWERS AND IT IS 
ESTOPPED TO DENY LIABILITY 
Tracy Collins claims for the first time on appeal that it did 
not have the power to execute the injunction bond and that the 
bond is therefore void. The defense of ultra vires cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Wallace Bank & Trust Co. v. 
First Nat'l Bank. 40 Idaho 712, 237 P. 284 (1925) (Court held 
defense of ultra vires cannot be plead for first time on appeal in 
the brief of a receiver of a bank appointed by the Comptroller of 
Currency of the United States). During trial and the Hearing on 
Sharps1 Motion to Set Liability on the Bond, Tracy Collins never 
questioned the validity of the bond. Transcript of Motion (R. at 
1640). In fact, in a Stipulation re: Tracy Collins Supersedeas 
Bond entered on December 23, 1988, Tracy repledged the $50,000 
bond as "the supersedeas bond of Tracy Collins securing accruing 
costs, interest and damages incurred by the Sharps in the event 
Tracy Collins does not prevail on its appeal." R. at 1583-84. On 
January 4, 1989, the district court entered its Order re: Tracy 
Collins Supersedeas Bond in reliance upon the Stipulation. R. at 
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1581-82. Tracy should not now be permitted to raise such a 
defense for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, the defense of ultra vires would have failed on the 
merits. A bank cannot avoid liability on a guaranty or surety 
contract "where the transaction is for the bank's benefit in 
furtherance of legitimate banking business." Ries Biologicals, 
Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 780 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986). In Ries 
Biologicals, the bank guaranteed the payment of supplies ordered 
by its debtor even though the benefit to the bank was 
"incidental." The Tenth Circuit held the bank's involvement as a 
guarantor was an effort to avoid losses from the failure of its 
debtor and, therefore, proper banking business. Id. Here, Tracy 
Collins, like the Bank of Santa Fe, benefited from and was highly 
motivated by bank business to issue the bond. Tracy Collins had 
loaned White Pine Ranches $650,000 to construct improvements on 
the Property and two-thirds of the loan was owing at the time of 
trial. By issuing the bond, Tracy Collins was protecting its 
security. The exercise of such a banking power can hardly be 
called ultra vires. 
Additionally, Tracy Collins is equitably estopped to deny 
liability on a bond or surety contract from which it benefits and 
upon which others rely. Creditors Claim & Adjustment Co. v. 
Northwest Loan & Trust Co., 81 Wash. 247, 142 P. 760 (1914) (If 
plaintiff performed on bond, defendant could not claim ultra 
vires); See U-M Inv. , 701 P.2d 1061. The surety in U-M Inv. 
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claimed its supersedeas bond was void since the court did not 
enter an order approving the bond. The Utah Supreme Court held 
the surety was estopped to deny liability stating: 
[Surety's] principals in this case have reaped the 
benefits of the appeal bond to achieve a stay of execu-
tion. •. . [Surety is] estopped from raising those 
objections now. 
701 P.2d at 1063; cf. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 
1977) . 
Here, Tracy Collins is equitably estopped to deny liability. 
The Sharps were prevented from foreclosing on the Property as a 
result of Tracy Collins' posting a bond and have been further 
stayed from execution since the bond continued as a supersedeas 
bond. Tracy posted the bond in response to court orders and the 
Sharps have reasonably relied on it to their detriment. There-
fore, at the very least, Tracy Collins is now estopped to allege 
an ultra vires act. 
The Commissioner contends that a doctrine analogous to that 
of "adverse dominion" should apply to excuse its failure to raise 
the ultra vires defense below. See Brief of Surety/Appellant at 
17-18. The doctrine of adverse dominion only applies to statute 
of limitation questions in suits brought against bank wrongdoers, 
officers and directors, and has nothing to do with actions involv-
ing third parties such as the Sharps in the instant case. See 
cases cited by Tracy Collins, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Hudson, 673 F.Supp. 1039 (D. Kan. 1987) ; Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Carlsonr 698 F.Supp. 178 (D. Minn. 1988). 
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Accordingly, Tracy Collins is prohibited and at least 
equitably estopped from raising the ultra vires defense for the 
first time on appeal. Even if the issue was to be decided on the 
merits, Tracy Collins1 acts were not ultra vires since it was 
attempting to protect its interest in the transaction. Finally, 
the doctrine of "adverse dominion" is inapplicable to the factual 
setting of the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Tracy Collins has failed to establish that the district court 
was clearly erroneous in entering its Order against Tracy Collins. 
The Findings, Conclusions and Supplemental Findings and Con-
clusions amply support the district court's Judgment awarding the 
Sharps damages as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction in 
the amount of $28,570.63. Such damages properly included the lost 
value of money (interest) during the injunction period and attor-
ney's fees and trustee's fees incurred as a result of the wrong-
fully issued injunction, limited to the amount the Judgment was 
undersecured by the fair market value of the Property. 
DATED this it" day of September, 1989. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Sharps 
BV T^^&JX. Cd^yQA^ 
Qonald J. Wihder 
Tamara K. Prince 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et 
Counterclaim-
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, et 
Counterclaim-
et al., : 
al. , : 
al. , : 
-Plaintiffs, 
al. , : 
-Defendants. : 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET 
LIABILITY ON BOND 
Civil No. C87-1621 
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick) 
The Motion of defendants John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp (hereinafter the "Sharps") came on regularly for hearing 
before this Court on September 16, 1988. Plaintiffs White Pine 
Ranches, White Pine Enterprises, Leon H. Saunders, Robert 
Felton, and Saunders Land Investment Corporation (hereinafter 
collectively "White Pine") appeared through their counsel, 
:0 * 
6 
,
J
 1 > 
—> 3 .,•. <N 
S -f <N ^ g -iJ CN 
S 2 H <^ * <? 
- = ^  ? ^  I ^ -X — a- x 22. 
Robert M. Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. The 
Sharps appeared through their counsel, Donald J. Winder, Kathy 
A. F. Davis and Tamara K. Prince. Tracy Collins Bank was repre-
sented by its counsel, Douglas J. Parry. No other parties in 
this action appeared either in person or through their counsel. 
The Court, having reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, 
having received and reviewed exhibits, having heard the argu-
ments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and 
enters the following in support of its Judgment entered against 
plaintiffs' sureties: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The 7.0414 acres of Lot 6, White Pine Ranches Phase I, 
according to the final recorded plat filed in the Summit County 
Recorder's Office, State of Utah, has a present fair market val-
ue per acre of $25,000.00, for a total present fair market value 
of $176,035.00 (Ex. 97). 
2. The unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" to the 
Judgment entered herein, with one sewer and water connection 
available, contains 27.6205 acres and has a present fair market 
value of $20,000.00 per acre, for a total present fair market 
value of $552,410.00 (R. 494 and Ex. 97). 
3. Therefore, the present fair market value of the prop-
erties upon which the Sharps may foreclose pursuant to the Judg-
ment is $728,445.00. 
4. Under the Judgment, this Court found various of the 
White Pine plaintiffs jointly and severally indebted to the 
_o_ 
Sharps in the total amount of $759,415.63, excluding interest at 
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of expend-
iture by the Sharps of trustee fees, Court costs, and attorneys' 
fees, and until paid by plaintiffs, and excluding interest and 
penalties assessed on delinquent property taxes from November 
30, 1984, through November 30, 1987, and excluding property tax-
es accruing but unpaid for 1988. 
5. Accordingly, the Sharps are under secured by the amount 
of $30,970.63, representing the difference between the Judgment I 
($759,415.63) and the present fair market value of these prop-
erties ($728,445.00). 
6. As a condition of the issuance of the Temporary Re-
straining Order herein, White Pine posted a bond in the amount I 
! 
of $2,400.00 with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986, J 
and subsequently, pursuant to this Court's Order, additional I 
security was posted by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of 
$50,000.00, which was filed January 11, 1988. 
7. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued in this matter 
by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986. j 
8. Interest on the principal due under the Trust Deed Note 
for the period July 1, 1986, to June 30, 1987, equalled! 
i 
$66,913.08, and interest for the period July 1, 1987 to j 
March 22, 1988, equalled $48,764.04 (Ex. 122). 
9. Delinquent property taxes due just for the year 1987j 
amounted to $2,144.15 for Lot 6 and $2,630.85 for the unplatted! 
acreage (Stipulation of counsel, R. 707-708). 
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10. Pursuant to the Second Supplement to Affidavit in Sup-
port of Request for Attorney's Fees, attorneys for the Sharps 
were able to identify that at least four percent (4%) of their 
total fees related to defense of White Pine's injunction. Four 
percent (4%) of $144,088.75 is equal to $5,763.55, excluding 
legal services from and after January, 1988, through the trial 
and post-trial motions herein (Supplement to Affidavit of 
Donald J. Winder dated September 9, 1988). 
Having made the above supplemental findings of fact, the 
Court herewith makes and enters the following in support of its 
Judgment entered against plaintiffs' sureties: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has previously ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the Temporary Restraining Order entered in this matter by 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986, was wrong-
fully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved. 
2. The Sharps, as the parties enjoined, are entitled to 
recover their costs and damages, including attorney's fees, in-
curred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. 
3. Having determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
the injunction, it is not necessary for this Court to inquire 
into the good faith or bad faith of plaintiffs in obtaining the 
injunction. 
4. The amount of interest alone which as accumulated since 
September, 1986, when the injunction was first issued, far ex-
,i _ 
ceeds the amount of both plaintiffs' cash bond and the security 
posted by Tracy Collins B^nk. 
lis 6f-*Q day c DATED thj of fit ., 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
HON 
^-
DERICK, Judge 
EST 
IXON HiNDLEY 
Ci®rx 
Depusy Owk 
